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EQUAL PROTECTION FOR THE
IlLEGTIMATE
Harry D. Krause*
Clearly, the procreation of illegitimate children cannot be said to be
a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States ....
-Miller, J., in Plunkard v. State (1887)1O NE in sixteen children is born a bastard.2 In some urban areas,
the incidence of illegitimacy rises to nearly forty per cent of
live births.8 Illegitimacy is a way of life-a second-class way of life,
4
imposed not only by the fact of birth outside a family, but by law
as well. Legislation within the following principal categories gener-
ally disfavors the illegitimate child-even when his father has been
ascertained:5
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B. 1954, J.D. 1958, University
of Michigan. Editorial Board, Vol. 56, Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
1. 67 Md. 864, 370, 10 Ad. 225, 227 (1887).
2. U.S. CENsus BuREAU, STATSTmCAL ABsTRAr OF THE UNrTD STATS 47, 51 (1965)
shows a total of 4,098,000 live births, and 259,400 illegitimate live births for 1963.
Subsequent adoptions improve the picture somewhat:
Of an estimated 2.5 million surviving children registered as illegitimate at
birth from 1940 through 1957, 1 million were white and 1.5 million, nonwhite....
Possibly as many as 70 per cent of all white illegitimate children are given for
adoption, but only between 3 and 5 per cent of the nonwhite illegitimate children
are adopted. Some children are legitimated through marriage of their parents.
Although no estimate is available the number is believed to be too small to affect
the percentage distribution.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, ILLEGITIMACY AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN PROGRAM 35-36 (1960).
3. Chicago (AP)-More than 100,000 babies have been born illegitimately in Cook
County during the last 10 years, a city committee said.... More than 10 per cent
of Cook County births were illegitimate in 1963, compared with an illegitimacy rate
of 6.3 per cent 10 years ago. In 1964, one out of seven births in Chicago [was]
illegitimate. The illegitimacy rate now ranges between 27.9 and 38.7 per cent in 14
Chicago census areas. The illegitimacy rate is increasing generally, but is increasing
faster among whites than among nonwhites.
Champaign-Urbana [Illinois] News-Gazette, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 13.
4. The bastard, like the prostitute, thief, and beggar, belongs to that motley crowd
of disreputable social types which society has generally resented, always endured.
He is a living symbol of social irregularity, and undeniable evidence of contramoral
forces; in short, a problem-a problem as old and unsolved as human existence
itself.
Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Ass. J. SOCIOLOGY 215 (1939).
5. Since there is little, if any, discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate
children in regard to rights against (and through) their mother, the primary concern
here will be with the relationship between the illegitimate and his father, and the
relationship between the illegitimate and the government. In the comparison of the
rights of the legitimate and the illegitimate child, it is not helpful that the rights of the
legitimate child, at least in some states and subject areas, have not been defined with
clarity, but often have been handled as an adjunct to the adjudication of the parents'
rights, usually in connection with divorce proceedings. See FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A
CHANGING SocIEY 225 (1959). For example, the common law's hesitancy to obligate
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Support: In most states, the father is responsible for the support
or maintenance of his illegitimate child, but in some he has no
support obligation at all.6 The mother usually also is asked to assist
in the support of the child. However, the level at which the child
must be maintained is often in the court's discretion; in only a few
jurisdictions is it fixed by statute. Although some states provide that
a judgment in a paternity action establishes an illegitimate's equal-
ity with a legitimate offspring of the father with respect to rights of
support,7 the legitimate child generally has broader rights than his
illegitimate brother as to both the level of support and the duration
of the obligation."
Inheritance: At common law, the bastard inherited from no
one.9 Although statutes in nearly all states provide that an illegiti-
mate child occupies the same position as a legitimate one with re-
spect to inheritance from his mother, the illegitimate child generally
cannot, except by will, inherit from his father unless the father has
formally recognized or acknowledged him. Indeed, even a judgment
in a paternity action only rarely gives the child the right to inherit
from his father. Furthermore, the intestacy laws do not always pro-
vide that the bastard inherits from the mother's family and only
rarely do they make provision for his inheritance from the father's
parents to support their legitimate children is documented in Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J.
426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953). Another disputed question is the child's right to the "services"
of his parents. PRossER, TORTS 908-09 (3d ed. 1964). However, the legitimate child
normally enjoys broad benefits by reason of the fact that he has been born into a
family context, and consequently he has not needed an affirmative statement of his
rights as urgently as has the illegitimate.
6. In Texas and Idaho the father has no obligation to support his illegitimate child.
In Missouri only a criminal action applies to nonsupport and in Virginia an obligation
of support is imposed on the father only where he has voluntarily and formally
recognized the child. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 559.353, .356 (Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
61.1 (1960). See James - v. Hutton, 373 S.W.2d 167 (Kan. City, Mo. Ct. App. 1963),
which refused to derive a civil liability from the criminal statute.
7. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106%, § 52 (1965); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 3-624 (1946); Ky. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 406.011 (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 257.23 (1959); N.J. Rv. STAT. § 9:16-2 (1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61.1 (1960).
8. The illegitimate's right of support is discussed in Krause, Bringing the Bastard
Into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TExAs L. Rav. 829,
850-52 (1966). As to the legitimate child's right of support, see JACOBS & GOErEL, CASES
ON DoMassTrO RELATIONS 977-95 (1961). See also FIEDMANN, Op. cit. supra note 5, at
246-51.
One of the most important problems with which the illegitimate is faced is that
many paternity statutes consider that not his but rather his mother's rights are in
issue. See, e.g., In re Paternity, 33 Ohio Op. 2d 299, 211 N.E.2d 894 (1965), in which the
illegitimate child unsuccessfully attempted to upset a compromise agreement between
the putative father and the child's mother.
9. The term flilius nullius originally referred to inheritance matters, and only later
was interpreted to deny any relationship between bastard and parent. HOOPm,
ILLEGIimACY 25-26, 27 (1911).
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family.10 On the other hand, these laws do generally designate
the legitimate child as an heir of his father, mother, ancestors and
collaterals, and sometimes, if rarely, limit the father's power to
disinherit his legitimate child.'1
Custody, Visitation and Adoption: Even though the legitimate
child's right to the company of his father is not altogether clear,12
it is certain that the illegitimate child fares worse. To the extent that
the legitimate child's rights follow at least de facto from the father's
parental authority over him (which includes the father's right to
custody and visitation), discrimination results from the fact that in
many states the father has no parental authority at all over his ille-
gitimate child. 3
10. The subject of the illegitimate's inheritance rights is discussed in Krause, supra
note 8, at 854-56. Aside from discrimination under the intestacy laws, the illegitimate
child also is disfavored by a long line of judicial decisions which construe the term
"child" for purposes of interpreting wills as not including an illegitimate child of the
testator. See Annot., Right of Illegitimate Child To Take Under Testamentary Gift
to "Children," 34 A.L.R.2d 4 (1954).
11. Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Nonbarrable Interests in Administration of De-
cedents' Estates, 8 FLA L. REv. 151 (1955). Theoretically, the bastard might fare better
than a legitimate child if he has a support judgment that is enforceable against his
father's estate and his father has disinherited the legitimate children. For example,
a support action against the father's estate is provided by IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-629 (1946).
12. Some doubt recently arose when Iowa's Supreme Court refused to grant custody
of a seven-year-old boy to his father who had remarried. The court concluded that the
child's best interests would be served if permanent custody were granted to his maternal
grandparents who had been asked by the boy's father to take care of the boy after
the mother's death. The court noted that the grandparents had given the boy "a
stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class, middiewest background," whereas the
boy's life with his father would be "unstable, unconventional, arty, bohemian, and
probably intellectually stimulating." Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa, 1966),
cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3175 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1966).
13. The illegitimate's situation in matters of custody, visitation and adoption is
discussed in Krause, supra note 8, at 857. To illustrate, in Petition of Malmstedt, 220
A.2d 147 (Md. Ct. App. 1966), the Maryland Court of Appeals refused to grant the
father of an illegitimate baby permission to adopt the child even though the mother
did not want to keep her. The mother turned the infant over to an adoption agency
three days after birth. Accord, In re Adoption of Irby, 226 Cal. App. 2d 238, 37 Cal. Rptr.
879 (1964); cf. Wallace v. Wallace, 60 Ill. App. 2d 300, 210 N.E.2d 4 (1965); De Phillips
v. De Phillips, 219 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. 1966), in which, on the basis of an Illinois statute
denying the illegitimate father the right of "custody or control," the fathers of illegiti-
mate children were not accorded rights of visitation. The courts also held that the
illegitimate child has no right to the company of his father and vice versa. Consider,
however, Justice Klingbiel's forceful dissent in De Phillips, 219 N.E. 2d at 467-68, in
which he relied on Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155
(1965), a case which reached the opposite result after reviewing the law of a number
of jurisdictions, and cases like Godinez v. Russo, 49 Misc. 2d 66, 266 N.Y.S.2d 636
(Farn. Ct. 1966) and Balint v. Horvath, 34 Ohio Op. 2d 247, 212 N.E.2d 200 (1965). In
Godinez, custody of two illegitimate children was awarded to the father where the
mother was considered unfit, the court deciding that the presumption in the mother's
favor should be abolished and that no distinction should be made between legitimate
and illegitimate children in questions of custody; in Balint it was held that under stat-
utory adoption procedures in Ohio, the natural father must be served with notice.
January 1967]
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Father's Name: The illegitimate generally has no right to bear
his father's name.14
State and Federal "Welfare Laws": A large and important cate-
gory of legislation which affects the illegitimate is the body of state
and federal "welfare" statutes that tie a child's eligibility for bene-
fits to the existence of a father who is primarily "covered" by the
legislation in question. On the state level, for example, are work-
men's compensation laws and wrongful death acts. While a growing
number of these enactments provide or have been interpreted to
provide that an illegitimate child is entitled to the same rights as a
legitimate child, there are still many states in which the illegitimate
children of covered fathers remain ineligible for these benefits.15
Under the federal welfare statutes which provide benefits for chil-
dren, 16 eligibility for such benefits is derived typically through the
child's father who, by membership in a given class or otherwise, has
"earned" the benefit. These statutes do not consistently provide
benefits for the illegitimate children of eligible fathers. The Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act,17 the Foreign
Service Act,'8 various items of veteran's legislation,'9 and the Social
Security Act20 expressly provide benefits for illegitimate children,
14. See Krause, supra note 8, at 858; cf. Hooper, supra note 9, at 6-7, 122-24. Hooper
provides some historical background on the name question, such as the fact that the
Norman prefix "Fitz" is said to have been the common prefix given by a father to a
bastard son whom he was willing to acknowledge.
In re M., 91 NJ. Super. 296, 219 A.2d 906 (1966), involved a minor who applied to
have his name changed from that of his mother to that of his natural father. The child's
father and mother desired the change of the child's name, but the father's wife objected.
The court granted the name change, since no "unworthy motive, the possibility of
fraud on the public, or the choice of a name that is bizarre, unduly lengthy, ridiculous
or offensive to common decency and good taste" was involved. 219 A.2d at 907.
15. See Krause, supra note 8, at 856-57.
16. See generally Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV.
L. REv. 337 (1962).
17. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 902(14) (1964) defines "child" to
include an "acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased."
18. 60 Stat. 1020 (1946), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1964) defines "child" to
include a "recognized natural child who received more than one-half of his support
from the participant."
19. 38 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1964) defines "child" to include:
an] illegitimate child but, as to the alleged father, only if acknowledged in writing
signed by him, or if he has been judicially ordered to contribute to the child's
support or has been, before his death, judicially decreed to be the father of such
child, or if he is otherwise shown by evidence satisfactory to the Administrator
to be the father of the child.
20. 64 Stat. 492 (1950), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(1964) provides:
(A) In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or
currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Secretary shall
apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate
personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is
[Vol. 65:477
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but impose varying standards of proof of paternity. A second group
of statutes, including the Federal Group Life Insurance Act21 and
the Copyright Act,22 does not define the term "child" so as to include
domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual
is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his
death, or, if such insured individual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by
the courts of the District of Columbia. Applicants who according to such law would
have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child or
parent shall be deemed such.
(B) If an applicant is a son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individual
but is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured individual under
subparagraph (A), such applicant shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child
of such insured individual if such insured individual and the mother or father,
as the case may be, of such applicant went through a marriage ceremony resulting
in a purported marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment de-
scribed in the last sentence of paragraph (1) (B), would have been a valid marriage.
The reference under § 416(h)(2)(A) to the state intestacy laws usually results in dis-
crimination against the illegitimate, since state intestacy laws generally do not permit
the illegitimate child to inherit from his father. See text at note 9 supra. In order to
reduce the incidence of such discrimination, a new subsection, § 416(h)(3), was added
in 1965. In the report accompanying this addition to § 416, the Senate Committee
expressed its belief that:
in a national program that is intended to pay benefits to replace the support lost
by a child when his father retires, dies, or becomes disabled, whether a child gets
benefits should not depend on whether he can inherit his father's intestate personal
property under the laws of the State in which his father happens to live.
S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-10 (1965).
In essence, the new section provides that:
an applicant will be considered the child of the worker if the worker (1) has
acknowledged in writing that he is the child's father; (2) has been decreed by a
court to be the child's father; (3) has been ordered by a court to contribute to the
support of the child because he is the child's father; or (4) is shown by other evi-
dence satisfactory to the Secretary to be the child's father and has been living with
or contributing to the support of the child.
Id. at 267.
21. 68 Stat. 738 (1954), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 2093 (1964) speaks of "the child or
children of such employee." Concerning this language, the court in Grove v. United
States, 170 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Va. 1959), said the following:
But there are many peculiar problems arising from the familial relationship and,
as there is no federal law of domestic relations, the matter is primarily of state
concern.. . . This court leans to the view that the state law must control the
familial relationship.
The court applied Virginia law which resulted in granting recovery to the child.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1964). The Act provides for renewal of copyright, if the holder is
deceased, by the "widow, widower, or children of the author." In DeSylva v. Ballentine,
351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956), this language was interpreted in accordance with state law
defining "child":
The scope of a Federal right is, of course, a Federal question, but that does not
mean that its content is not to be determined by state, rather than federal law...
This is especially true where a statute deals with a familial relationship; there is
no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.
The court applied California law so as to include the bastard within the definition of
"child." Cf. 351 U.S. at 583-84 (Douglas, J., concurring):
But I would think the statutory policy of protecting dependents would be better
served by uniformity, rather than by the diversity which would flow from in-
corporating into the Act the laws of forty eight states.... I would ... regardless
of state law, hold that illegitimate children were "children" within the meaning
of § 24 of the Copyright Act.
January 1967]
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or exclude illegitimates expressly, and here the courts have looked
to state law for a definition of "child." In dealing with a third group
of laws, such as the Federal Death on the High Seas Act23 and, it
appears, the Federal Employer's Liability Act24 and the Jones Act,25
the courts have developed a "federal" definition of "child" which
includes illegitimates. Thus the federal attitude toward the in-
clusion of illegitimates within the class of children who are eligible
to receive benefits under "welfare" laws consists of a mixture of
deference to state policy in the field of family relations, habit rooted
in long continued common law and social discrimination against
the illegitimate, and concern about the problem of proof of pater-
nity.28 On balance, however, the federal welfare laws have gone far
toward eliminating discrimination against the illegitimate, the long-
est step having been taken in the 1965 amendment to the Social
Security Act.27
23. 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 761 (1964): "IIThe personal representative of the
decedent may maintain a suit for damages ... for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's
wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative." The term "child" has been held to
include illegitimates by the application of a federal, not state law definition. Middleton
v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934).
24. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964) provides for damage
liability for the death of an employee "to his or her personal representative for the
benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee." 36 Stat.
291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1964) provides that a right of action for injury to an
employee "shall survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the
surviving widow or husband and children of such employee." In Huber v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 241 F. Supp. 646 (D. Md. 1965), § 51 was interpreted to apply a federal definition
of "children," unless it were in conflict with a clear state policy. In Bowen v. New York
Cent. R.R., 179 F. Supp. 225 (D. Mass. 1959), on the other hand, § 59 of the Act had
been interpreted to refer to the state law definition of "children" which, in that case,
resulted in the denying of recovery to the illegitimate child.
25. 38 Stat. 1185 (1950), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964) provides: "Mhe
personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law...
and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of
action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable." The reference
to "railway employees" involves 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1964); see cases discussed supra note 24. But cf. Civil v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 217 F.2d
94 (2d Cir. 1954), which compares the statutory language of 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
§ 761 (1964), and 36 Stat. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1964), and adopts the Luckenbach
view, supra note 23.
26. Indeed, there are other less liberal federal laws affecting the illegitimate. For
instance, federal law covering the full range of the illegitimate's legal relationships
applies in the District of Columbia. The child has a right of support and education
against his father "commensurate with defendant's ability to pay ...until the child
reaches the age of 16 years," D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2349 (Supp. 1966), but does not have
the right to inherit from his father or his father's family. Inheritance rights for the
bastard are provided only with respect to his mother, siblings, and their descendants,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-316 (Supp. 1966); Blethyn v. Bidder, 80 F. Supp. 962, 963 (D.D.C.
1948). See also 66 Stat. 238 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1964) (citizenship legislation).
27. See note 20 supra.
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I. THE EQUAL PROTECrION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF ILLEGITIMACY
No State shall . .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
In our time the general constitutional phrase promising equal
protection has become specific law. It has been used to invalidate
many state statutes which discriminated on the basis of race or other
arbitrary criteria. Definite rules have been developed for this process
of invalidation. These rules will be applied below to state and
federal legislation that favors the legitimate child and discriminates
against the illegitimate in matters of inheritance rights, rights of
support, rights of name and custody, and social welfare.28 The ques-
tion that will be asked is whether state and federal legislation may
constitutionally discriminate between children on the basis of their
birth in or out of wedlock.
Surprisingly, a search of probable sources disclosed no case in
which the question of the validity of discrimination against the
illigitimate was discussed in equal protection terms, although at
least one court chose to ignore an opportunity for such a discus-
sion.29 Even more surprisingly, a search of equal protection litera-
ture turned up scant reference to illegitimacy as a questionable
classification.30 Nevertheless, one should not be startled by the use of
the equal protection clause in an analysis of the problem of discrim-
ination against the illegitimate, for the bastard's demand for equal-
ity may be traced back at least to the French revolution 31 and more
recently has found expression in the post-war West German consti-
28. Although the Supreme Court, in the first case in which it was called upon to
interpret the equal protection clause, expressed doubt whether the clause reached any
discrimination other than state discrimination against Negroes on account of their
race, the provision has for a long time been applied to various other types of dis-
crimination. See The Constitution of the United States of America, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1279-1321 (1964).
29. In Brown v. Brown, 183 Va. 353, 357, 32 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1944), a bastard sued his
father for support in the absence of an applicable statute. In response to the child's
constitutional argument, the court merely commented: "there is no merit in the
contention that a denial of recovery in this case would result in a violation of the
appellants rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth amendment . . . and under . . .
the Constitution of Virginia."
30. Note, "Suitable Home" Tests Under Social Security: A Functional Approach to
Equal Protection, 70 YALE L.J. 1192, 1201 (1961). The equal protection argument is
raised more forcefully by FooTE, LaEv AND SANDERS, CASES ON FAMILY LAw 72-73 (1966),
whose standard-setting new work was published after this article was completed.




tution.32 Furthermore, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals has applied
the equal protection clause in a remarkable recent case involving ille-
gitimacy. The court refused to enforce a Kentucky judgment which
would have required a Texas father to support his illegitimate
child.3 3 The Texas court reasoned that to obligate this father to
support his child would be to deny the father equal protection of
the laws, since Texas law did not impose a support obligation on
fathers of illegitimate children.
It is time that the matter be considered from the standpoint of
the childl
The equal protection clause does not forbid "unequal laws" and
does not require every law to be equally applicable to all individ-
uals.3 4 Of necessity, classification must be permitted; otherwise there
could be no meaningful legislation.35 The question asked under the
fourteenth amendment thus is whether a given piece of legislation
operates "equally" upon all members of a group that is defined
reasonably and in terms of a proper purpose. Two levels of inquiry
must be distinguished. First, a law does not provide equal protection
if it applies only to part of a larger group that is similarly situated in
32. GERMAN FED. REP. CONST. art. VI (5). In Germany, a new statute that seeks to
realize equality for the illegitimate is presently being drafted by the Ministry of Justice.
It is expected that information concerning the draft statute will have been made
available to interested parties late in 1966. Letter From Dr. Jansen, Ministry of Justice,
Bonn, Germany, to the author, Feb. 11, 1966.
33. Bjorgo v. Bjorgo, 391 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), rev'd, 402 S.W.2d
143 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1966).
34. Equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances
in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights;.., all persons should be equally
entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire and enjoy property; .. . they
should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their
persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement
of contracts; ... no impediment should be interposed to the pursuits of anyone
except as applied to the same pursuits by others under like circumstances;...
no greater burdens should bhae ld uo o t e laid upon others in the same
calling and condition, and . . . in the administration of criminal justice no
different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is pre-
scribed to all for like offenses .... [Equal protection is not] designed to interfere
with the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of
the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop
its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity. . . .Regulations for these
purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but
they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon anyone,
but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general
good. Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their character, they do
not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons
and property under the same circumstances and conditions.
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885). See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L. Rv. 341 (1949), and S. Doc. No. 39, supra
note 28, at 1283-84.
35. See S. Doc. No. 39, supra note 28, at 1284-85.
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relation to the purpose of the legislation, or if the criteria defining
the covered group are such that they bring within that group some
individuals who are not similarly situated, again tested in terms of
the purpose of the legislation.36 On this first level no question is
raised as to the propriety of the statutory purpose; the test con-
sists of a mechanical comparison of the group which is the ob-
ject of the statutory concern with the group which is defined
by the statutory language.37 Both the over- and the under-inclusive-
ness of a group are illustrated by Skihner v. Oklahoma,3 8 a case in-
volving the statutory classification of habitual, hereditary criminals
for purposes of sterilization. The classification which was employed
was under-inclusive in that it failed to include, along with habitual
robbers, other offenders of "intrinsically the same quality", such as
embezzlers. At the same time, the classification was over-inclusive
because not all habitual robbers necessarily are hereditary crim-
inals.39 A sad example of a well-defined group is furmished by Plessy
v. Ferguson,40 in which the plaintiff, a person of seven-eighths white
descent, was told that he had no right to be treated as a white citizen
if the state law classified him as a Negro. The statute met the con-
stitutional test because it applied to him just as it applied to other
Negroes, and such an application was in direct furtherance of the
purpose of the statute-racial segregation. If the equal protection
clause had remained limited to this mechanical function, it would
not have become very famous. However, the Plessy Court's deference
to the statutory purpose41 has been overcome, and modern courts
36. "The ultimate test of validity is not whether foreign corporations differ from
domestic, but whether the differences between them are pertinent to the subject with
respect to which the classification is made." Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell,
294 U.S. 580, 583 (1935). (Emphasis added.)
37. Over-inclusiveness is the worse offense and usually shifts the case into the due
process area. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 878 U.S. 500, 510-12 (1964). As to
under-inclusiveness, the state is not prevented by the equal protection clause from
confining "its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clear-
est." Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 384 (1915). "[T]he law does all that is needed when
it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to
bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow."
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). On the other hand, "sterilization of those who
have thrice committed grand larceny, with immunity for those who are embezzlers, is
a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942). See also Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 34, at 348-49, 351.
38. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
39. 316 U.S. at 544-45 (Stone, C. J., concurring).
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41. [T]he case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is
a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large
discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of reason-
ableness it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs
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have realized that the purpose of the statute may itself be in violation
of the equal protection clause, aside from problems of over- and
under-inclusiveness that may or may not be present.42 This is the
second level of inquiry.
Viewed in this light, it might be said that we ask not only
whether the classification includes all who are situated similarly, but
also whether the purpose of the grouping is proper. A statute which
segregates Negroes passes the first test if it applies equally to all
Negroes, but fails the second, since there is no reason for classifying
Negroes and whites in separate groups43 other than the improper
reason of maintaining in an unequal position two groups which
for all rational purposes are situated similarly. 44 Likewise, men and
women are "situated similarly" for many rational purposes, and
therefore, if challenged on constitutional grounds, it is not neces-
sarily enough that legislation discriminating against women applies
equally to all women.45 Thus, to show that legislation discriminating
against the illegitimate applies equally to all illegitimates, regardless
of color, nationality, or sex, does not prove the validity of such legis-
lation. The question is whether the criterion of illegitimacy may be
used as the basis for a legislative classification. Employing the second
test that has been defined, it would follow that legislation denying to
the illegitimate rights that are granted to those of legitimate birth is
acceptable only if it is related to a proper public concern with respect
to which legitimate and illegitimate children are not situated simi-
larly. The legislation fails the constitutional test if it is not so related.
Clearly, then, in order to test for equal protection purposes the laws
regulating the status of the illegitimate, their legislative purposes
must be defined and evaluated.46 Long ago, Mr. Justice Van Devan-
and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort,
and the preservation of public peace and good order.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
42. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 34, at 356, go so far as to say that "the sig-
nificant formulation, suggested by the Rutledge dissent in [Kotch v. Board of River
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947)], is that even if the classification is reasonably
related to a legitimate public purpose, the employment of a forbidden trait invalidates
it."
43. Cf. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), which is discussed
in similar terms by Tussman & tenlBroek, supra note 34, at 374-75.
44. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YAix L.J. 421, 424
(1960); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. RMv.
1, 32 (1959). The adoption of the fourteenth amendment, of course, had ended doubt
as to the Negro's equality, but what is now viewed as unequal legislation drew its life
at that time from the notion that separateness did not mean inequality.
45. See Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title
VII, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 232 (1965).
46. Viewed in this light the prohibition against discriminatory legislation is a
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ter stated the Supreme Court's traditional view concerning this
evaluation:
The rules by which this contention must be tested . . . are these:
1. The equal-protection clause ... does not take from the state the
power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what
is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore
is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis
does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made
with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality. 8. When the classification in such a law is called in
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in
such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest
upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary . . .
Mr. Justice Van Devanter expressed the Court's reluctance to inter-
fere with state law where the equal protection clause is invoked to
protect economic interests. Indeed, this reluctance has been likened
to a presumption of constitutionality.48 However, this presumption
is reversed where the "basic civil rights of man" are at issue.49 Very
recently, Mr. Justice Douglas said:
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we
have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more
than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was
demand for purity of motive. It erects a constitutional barrier against legislative
motives of hate, prejudice, vengeance, hostility, or, alternatively, of favoritism, and
partiality. The imposition of special burdens, the granting of special benefits, must
always be justified. They can only be justified as being directed at the elimination
of some social evil, the achievement of some public good. When and if the pro-
scribed motives replace a concern for the public good as the "purpose" of the
law, there is a violation of the equal protection prohibition against discriminatory
legislation.
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 34, at 358-59. While "motive" may be difficult to
identify if a law can be justified in terms of some regulatory purpose, motive becomes
clear in the absence of such a purpose. The difficulty that has concerned the authors
and the courts in cases of this type (to distinguish between regulatory purpose and
prejudice in cases where some regulatory ends were served), is largely absent in the
case of discrimination against the illegitimate where, as will be shown below, a rational
purpose only rarely befogs the issue. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962)
(Brennan, J.): judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed
and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the fourteenth
amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination
reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.
47. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
48. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Pro-
tection, 61 Micir. L. Rv. 645, 666 (1963).




at a given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights....
Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause do change.... We have long been mindful
that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or re-
strain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.r0
It would seem to be beyond question that a child's right to a familial
relationship with his father is more akin to a "fundamental right
and liberty" or a "basic civil right of man" than to a mere
economic interest. Although money is involved, the illegitimate's
claim goes much further, for it centers on his second-class status
in our society-a society in which illegitimacy is a "psychic ca-
tastrophe" and in which recovery in tort is granted for a false
allegation of illegitimacy.51 Indeed, the psychological effect of
the stigma of bastardy upon its victim 52 seems quite comparable to
the damaging psychological effects upon the victims of racial dis-
crimination, which effects were successfully exploited in the bat-
tle over school segregation.53 In other words, a classification based
on a criterion of illegitimacy is a vulnerable one, with respect to
which the presumption of constitutionality is reversed. Nevertheless,
no universal, black-white answer is either possible or desirable; this
writer will not argue that all distinctions between the legitimate
50. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669, 670 (1966). (Citation
omitted.)
51. "In the case of illegitimate birth the child's reactions to life are bound to be
completely abnormal.... To be fatherless is hard enough, but to be fatherless with
the stigma of illegitimate birth is a psychic catastrophe." Fodor, Emotional Trauma
Resulting From Illegitimate Birth, 54 ARcmvH s oF NEUROLOGY AND PsYcmARY 381
(1945). See also note 52 infra. The tort point is covered at note 75 infra.
52. Jenkins, An Experimental Study of the Relationship of Legitimate and Illegiti-
mate Birth Status to School and Personal and Social Adjustment of Negro Children, 64
Am. J. SocioLoGy 169 (1958), in which the author investigated whether there were
significant differences in the "adjustment" of legitimate and illegitimate Negro school
children. All children in the sample were recipients of Aid to Dependent Children's
funds and otherwise lived in comparable economic and social circumstances. "Adjust-
ment" was considered to be reflected in I.Q., age-grade placement, school absences,
academic grades, teacher's rating, and personal and social adjustment as measured by
the California test of personality. Jenkins reported that:
Two primary patterns emerged in this study. First, the legitimate children rated
higher in every area except school absences....
The second discernible pattern was that the older group of illegitimate children
consistently made a poorer showing than the younger group, in comparison with
the legitimate children. A possible explanation for this is that, as these children
grow older and are able to internalize fully the concept of illegitimacy and as they
become increasingly aware of their socially inferior status, their adjustment to self
and society may become progressively less satisfactory.
Id. at 173.
53. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Note, Grade School Segrega-
tion: The Latest Attack on Racial Discrimination, 61 YALE L.J. 730 (1952).
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and the illegitimate are not of proper concern to the state in the
exercise of its police power.
There is no difficulty in establishing "state action" as a source of
the discrimination against illegitimates. While much of the bastard's
problem may result from private discrimination,54 there is no doubt
that it is state action when the illegitimate child does not inherit
under the intestacy laws, when his statutory right of support is
either non-existent or limited, or when he does not qualify under
welfare laws. With respect to federal legislation, though, another
bridge must be crossed before the equal protection rationale may
be applied, for the fifth amendment does not express a requirement
of equal protection. However, there is evidence that, with respect
to equal protection questions, the fifth amendment is to federal legis-
lation what the fourteenth amendment is to state action. 55 Thus,
the same test which is applied to state legislation which discriminates
against the illegitimate should also be applied to federal laws.
II. AN EVALUATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
LEGISLATION WHICH DIsCIMINATEs AGAINST ILLEGITI-
MATES AND ITS REGULATORY PURPOSES
Discrimination against the illegitimate is rooted so deeply in
our culture that legislative enactments on illegitimacy are generally
silent as to legislative purpose. Furthermore, most legislation in-
volving illegitimacy has been favorable in that it has reduced the
burden that was imposed upon the illegitimate by the common law.
The present concern is not with the purposes of these laws; at issue
are the reasons that might be thought to justify continued discrimi-
nation.
A. Uncertainty of Paternity
It may be argued that illegitimate birth furnishes less convincing
evidence of paternity than does birth in wedlock, or that illegiti-
mate paternity often cannot be established with the degree of
certainty with which the child of a marriage may be ascribed to his
father. Some may say that a mere support obligation is imposed on
the father because to impose more would burden too heavily one
who.might not be the father. In cases of uncertain paternity, this
54. The question as to the extent to which the fourteenth amendment covers
private discrimination is unsettled. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
55. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); S. Doc. No. 39, supra note 28, at 973-75.
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argument would carry weight, although it might be preferable if no
obligation at all were imposed in such cases.56 However, the fact that
uncertainty may exist in one illegitimate paternity case is not to
say that uncertainty exists in every case. It may be stipulated that the
equal protection argument is limited to those illegitimates whose
paternity has been or can be established with at least the same
degree of probability as the paternity of a legitimate child is estab-
lished by his birth in wedlock. In many cases this can be done now,
and, with appropriate changes in procedure, it could be done in
more cases.57 Modem techniques for the testing of blood have moved
56. The desirability of holding several suspected fathers jointly liable where the
alternative is to leave the child without support is persuasively argued in Note, Lia-
bility of Possible Fathers: A Support Remedy for Illegitimate Children, 18 STAN. L. REV.
859 (1966). While this writer has reservations as to the validity of the joint liability
approach, it is arguable that, whatever may be said against it, the alternative of leaving
the child without support may be worse. A joint support obligation is not necessarily
in conflict with the thesis of this article, since such an obligation would be imposed
only if paternity could not be established with the degree of certainty that would
warrant legitimate status for the child. The related question whether the state has an
obligation to take action to ascertain the identity of father is raised in the text at
note 93 infra.
57. The type of paternity proceeding now available in many states may not provide
the best possible mechanism for ascertaining paternity. There is room for doubt and
reason for concern if the percentage of convictions in paternity cases reaches 95% in
a typical metropolitan county. See Glazer, Blood Grouping Tests in the Proof of Non-
Paternity, 33 Mich. St. B.J., No. 1, pp. 12, 17 (1954). However, this provides an argu-
ment not against the providing of the substantive rights that are the subject of this
paper, but rather against the present methods of ascertaining paternity. The difficulty
may center on the jury which seems especially likely to err in the emotion-charged
atmosphere of the typical paternity suit because deep-seated notions of morality tend
to transcend applicable secular law. Other problems stem from the criminal nature of
the proceeding in many states which, especially when combined with a prosecution for
fornication, puts the case on the level of determining moral "guilt" or "innocence"
rather than objectively ascertaining a state of facts, although it may be said that in a
criminal proceeding the required higher standard of proof and the various constitu-
tional law guaranties actually safeguard the rights of the accused. Arguably, if legitima-
tion, rather than only a support obligation, is the result of a successful paternity action,
even a civil proceeding should employ the standard of proof of the criminal law, i.e.
proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" rather than the weaker civil standard of a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence." Cf. Krause, supra note 8, at 829 (§ 18), 853. It also seems
clear that more should be done to obtain the father's voluntary cooperation. See
CHOATE & GALLAGHER (CHILDREN'S BUREAU), UNMARRIED PARENTs-A GUIDE FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SERVICES IN PUBLIC WELFARE 36-37 (1961); Pannor, Casework Services
for Unmarried Fathers, 10 CHILDREN 65 (1963). However, proposals as to new procedures
are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that if existing procedures are
inadequate, the answer is that new procedures must be devised rather than that rights
must be denied. In a different context, the Utah Supreme Court said not long ago:
Due to the highly subjective and volatile nature of emotional distress ... , the
courts have historically been wary of dangers in opening the door to recovery
therefor. This is partly because such claims may easily be fabricated: or as some-
times stated, are easy to assert and hard to defend against.
It is .. . to be observed that the argument against allowing such an action
because groundless charges may be made is not a good reason for denying recovery.
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beyond the point of merely establishing exclusions for narrow groups
of lucky non-fathers;58 it should also be considered that there is noth-
ing foolproof about birth in wedlock.59 Furthermore, voluntary co-
operation can be obtained from some illegitimate fathers.
B. Discouraging Promiscuity
There is no question that the state may properly regulate many
aspects of sexual conduct. Our society holds that intercourse outside
If the right to recover for injury resulting from the wrongful conduct could be
defeated whenever such dangers exist, many of the grievances the law deals with
would be eliminated. That some claims may be spurious should not compel those
who administer justice to shut their eyes to serious wrongs .... It is the function
of courts and juries to determine whether claims are valid or false. This re-
sponsibility should not be shunned merely because the task may be difficult to
perform.
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 291, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 345, 347 (1961). (Emphasis
added.)
58. Indeed, if progress in the law of evidence would keep up with scientific progress,
see generally Korn, Law, Fact and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUmN. L. REV. 1080 (1966),
the possibility of holding a non-father liable in a paternity action may soon disappear
as a realistic concern. In the near future, we may see biological tests carried to the
point, for most practical purposes, of positively establishing paternity. Recent German
decisions have done as much. In one case, detailed blood tests were considered to
establish a 99.55% probability of paternity. L. G. Koeln, 13.10.1961, 16 MONATSSCmURFT
FUER DEUTScHEs REcsrr 309 (1962). In another paternity case reviewed in 1964, the West
German Supreme Court held that a blood test taken as recently as 1955 that had failed
to exclude defendant as a possible father was not conclusive in view of newly developed,
more sophisticated methods of blood testing that now might result in defendant's ex-
clusion as a possible father. BGH 5.2.1964, 11 ZEITSCmUrr FUER DAS GESAMTE FAMILIEN-
REcHT 251 (1964). Recent progress in blood research is outlined in Blood Groups, 3
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrrANNICA 804 (1966). See also Ross, The Value of Blood Tests
as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HARv. L. REv. 466 (1958); SCHATEIN, DIsPUTED PA-
TERNITY PROCEEDINGS 492-99 (1953). Schatkin says that "the average chances of an
innocent man of obtaining an exclusion are about 55%, and with rarer blood con-
stellations... the chances may be as high as 82%." Schatkin, Paternity Proceedings and
Blood Tests, ABA PROcrEDINGS OF SECTION OF FAMILY LAw 14, 15 (1960). The famous
Charlie Chaplin case, Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946), 74
Cal. App. 2d 669, 169 P.2d 453 (1946) with its verdict "contrary to science, nature and
truth" is an example of what wrong can happen in a paternity proceeding. See
SC ATKIN, op. cit. supra at 250-63, for a full discussion of the case. However, similar
miscarriages of justice can result in the context of a marriage; for example, California
and Oregon have a conclusive presumption of legitimacy as to children born in wed-
lock, unless, given cohabitation, the husband is impotent. CAL. EvID. CODE § 621
(1965); OaE. REv. STAT. § 41.350(6) (1963). Other states employ a rebuttable presump-
tion of legitimacy, but make the rebuttal difficult. Krause, supra note 8, at 844.
59. Kinsey reports that "among the married females in the sample, about a quarter
(26%) had had extra-marital coitus by age forty." While Kinsey suggests that preg-
nancies resulting from such activity often end in abortion, or that affected marriages
end in divorces, he allows for extra-marital children being raised in their mothers'
homes without the truth being known to their husbands. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEAVIOR IN
THE HUMAN FEMALE 416, 434 (1953); cf. Whitman v. Whitman, 215 N.W.2d 689 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1966) which upheld the legitimacy of a child born in 1962 to the wife of a
man who had been sterilized in 1946, had enjoyed childless but happy sexual relations
with his wife from then until 1963, and had been found sterile by medical examination
shortly before the trial.
Michigan Law Review
of marriage is undesirable, and thus the discouragement of "illicit"
intercourse is considered a proper end of legislation. Given this
valid purpose, however, a connection must still be established be-
tween the legal status of the bastard and his parents' conduct. The
only connection, if one exists, lies in the expectation that potential
parents will be so concerned about the treatment that awaits their
illegitimate child at the hands of the law that they will refrain from
illicit conduct. This raises the question whether a law may properly
punish one in order to evoke guilt feelings in another whose con-
duct is to be affected. To ask the question is to answer it.6 0
Furthermore, laws discriminating against illegitimate children
have very little effect on their parents' sexual conduct, as is evi-
denced by the statistics on illegitimate births.61 Indeed, it is prob-
able that the father would be more effectively discouraged from
illicit intercourse if his risk of incurring a serious obligation were
substantially increased, that is, if a resulting child were given legiti-
mate status. As to the mother, the social shame of having an illegiti-
mate child and the resulting lessened chance of marriage probably
does tend to discourage illicit relations or, at least, to encourage
birth control practices. However, the social "shame" of illegitimate
pregnancy is not necessarily tied to legislated discrimination against
the illegitimate.62
C. Protection of the Family Unit
The family is the basic social organism in Western society. The
propriety of the state's interest in the family therefore is beyond
question, and state legislation fairly designed to encourage the
stability of the family must go unchallenged. Consequently, if dis-
criminatory laws directed against illegitimates protect the stability
60. Cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964) (citations omitted):
It is a familiar and basic principle, recently reaffirmed in NAACP v. Alabama ....
that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep un-
necessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." . . . In
applying this principle the Court in NAACP v. Alabama, supra, referred to the
criteria enunciated in Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 488: "(E)ven though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."
This principle requires that we consider the congressional purpose underlying...
the ... Act.
61. See note 2 supra.
62. See note 60 supra. It also should be noted that, in a social environment where
the "shame" problem is serious, it is perhaps most likely that the potential mother's
feelings will crystallize in her procuring an illegal abortion.
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of marriage and the family, they may pass the test of the equal pro-
tection clause.
The family protection argument basically is that giving the
bastard the rights of a legitimate child would discourage marriage,
since no advantage would remain to be derived from marriage. It
is feared that absent the social stigma which attaches to one giving
birth to an illegitimate child, fewer parents would find it worth-
while to give their union the permanence which a formal marriage
provides and which the law may properly enhance.
The gist of the theory is that the function of reproduction can
be carried out in a socially useful manner only if it is performed in
conformity with institutional patterns, because only by means of an
institutional system can individuals be organized and taught to co-
operate in the performance of this long-range function, and the
function be integrated with other social functions. The reproduc-
tive or familial institutions constitute the social machinery in terms
of which the creation of new members of society is supposed to take
place. The birth of children that do not fit into this machinery must
necessarily receive the disapproval of society, else the institutional
system itself, which depends upon favorable attitudes in individuals,
would not be approved or sustained.63
Similar reasoning has already been answered in connection with
the "promiscuity" argument.64 To repeat, if the state wishes to dis-
courage casual unions, it should do so directly, as, for example, by
laws punishing fornication65 or providing incentives for marriage, 66
rather than by placing at a disadvantage a group that cannot prevent
the mischief against which the law is directed. It may also be rele-
vant to consider that, whatever the strength of the argument of
family protection once may have been, the concept of the family as
a social institution has undergone a profound change in the last few
63. Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Am. J. SOCIOLOGY 215, 219 (1939).
64. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
65. It would not do to punish the parents for the illegitimate birth of the child
because whether the punishment consisted of a fine or a jail sentence, the child
ultimately would bear the burden of such punishment. Cf. note 85 infra; Miss. CODE
ANN. § 2018.6.1 (1964 Supp.) which provides that:
If any person, who shall have previously become the natural parent of an illegiti-
mate child . . . shall again become the natural parent of an illegitimate child
born within this State, he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be punished .... Provided, however, that . . . multiple
births shall be construed to be the birth of one (1) child.
66. Consider presently available tax incentives for married persons, such as exemp-
tions and income splitting privileges. Some welfare arrangements, on the other hand,
discourage marriage and legitimacy. For example, a widow who remarries often will
lose pension benefits derived through her first husband. Finally, the widespread un-
availability to the "poor" of legal aid services that include family matters, such as
divorces and legitimation, contributes to the incidence of illegitimacy.
January 1967]
Michigan Law Review
centuries. It may well be sound to conclude that the bastard does not
have the relevancy to the modem, pragmatic concept of marriage
that he possessed when the family was viewed primarily as a reli-
gious, sacred institution."r
A pragmatic approach to family protection focuses on the father's
legitimate family and asks whether it would harm that unit if his
illegitimate child were granted a full relationship with him. Should
a wife be compelled to accept her husband's extra-marital child into
her house? Should a wife's inheritance be reduced in favor of an
illegitimate? Should legitimate children be asked to share the atten-
tion, company, and money of their father with an extra-marital
half-sibling? These are valid questions, but all of these questions,
ranging from the child's right of inheritance, to support, custody
and name matters, 8 may be asked as well of the legitimate child of
a father's earlier marriage. In any relevant sense, the father's pre-
marital illegitimate child and his child of an earlier marriage are
thus "situated similarly." 69 Perhaps the most cogent distinction lies
in the wife's emotions, but even if the wife were granted a hearing,
it must be concluded that her problem is hardly comparable to the
problems of the child. It already has been pointed out that the stigma
of bastardy tends to produce severe psychological effects on the victims
67. With reference to the law of divorce, Professor Friedmann said of the social
status of the family:
Today, the family is to a far lesser extent than in earlier times held together
by economic necessity or social subservience. In modem Western Society, women
can and do operate a business, exercise a profession or seek industrial employment.
In times of depression or in marriages entered into by very young people, the
wife is sometimes the main breadwinner, at least temporarily. Children, subject
to certain social legislation, go out and earn wages long before they have attained
full legal capacity.
It is by no means a bad thing that the bonds of a family, including those
between husband and wife, should no longer repose essentially on a stem re-
ligious doctrine or on the economic necessity of hanging together as a family, or
on the social and legal supremacy of the husband and father. It may be a sign of
maturity that, as it has been said "of the earlier bonds of family, only mutual
affection and responsibility for the raising of children are today important, at least
in modem Western society." This change in the foundations of family cohesion
does, however, compel a reassessment of the legal remedies for the enforcement of
its cohesion or, where necessary, dissolution.
FREDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocEry 224-25 (1959). These arguments apply with
equal force with respect to the legal status of the illegitimate to the extent discrimina-
tion originally resulted from the religious orientation of the family concept. Cf. note 84
infra. Friedmann himself strongly favors reform of the law of illegitimacy, saying that
"[the stigma that modem Western society still generally, though probably decreasingly,
places upon the illegitimate child is utterly at variance with the ethical standards by
which we profess to be guided." Friedmann, op. cit. supra at 253.
68. For a detailed discussion of these subjects, see text accompanying notes 89-91
infra.
69. The position of the "adulterous bastard," born outside of an existing marriage,
is more difficult, but even great concern for the protection of the existing family does
not warrant denying the child some relationship with his father.
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of discrimination that are comparable to the damaging psychological
effects resulting from racial discrimination.70 Finally, the fact that
discrimination against the illegitimate continues unabated even
where there is no family in the picture is more evidence of the
inappropriateness of the criterion of legitimacy to the state's interest
in protecting the family.
D. Actual Relationship with Father
An attractive reason which may be invoked to justify discrim-
ination against the illegitimate is found in the actual, living
family relationship a father normally has with his legitimate chil-
dren, a type of relationship he usually would not have with his ille-
gitimate child. Indeed, legislation which focused on this difference
might be difficult to fault, were it not for the fact that the denial of
a relationship with his father is precisely the wrong of which the
illegitimate is complaining. To argue that because the illegitimate
does not have a relationship with his father he should not be entitled
to one is bootstrapping. Furthermore, the discriminatory legislation
which is attacked here does not define its classes in terms of the
actual father-child relationship. Whether living in a family setting
or not, the legitimate child enjoys broader rights against his father
(whom he might never have seen) than does the illegitimate (who
might, in fact, live with his father and mother in a permanent family-
like situation). Therefore, even if children might reasonably be
classified on the basis of whether they live and share their lives with
their fathers, the definition of these two groups by means of the
criterion of birth in or out of wedlock is over-inclusive in that it
covers children who are legitimate but who do not live with their
fathers and under-inclusive in that it excludes illegitimates who do
live with their fathers.
E. The Father's Choice
Racial discrimination violates the Constitution because it has
no rational basis. Is there no rational basis for the state to take the
position that the father may bestow on the child of his wife certain
rights that he withholds from the child of his mistress? Approached
from this direction, the key to the child's status is the father's volun-
tary acceptance of the legal obligations summarized in the word
"legitimacy." This may occur directly in a transaction between the
70. See notes 51-53 supra.
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child and the father, as in legitimation or adoption, or indirectly
through the contract of marriage, which might be viewed as a third
party beneficiary contract by which the father prospectively confers
legitimacy on all children resulting from the marriage. Other situa-
tions in which the law permits a choice as to whether to grant or
withhold benefits superficially support this focus on the father's
consent. For example, a father may generally disinherit even his
legitimate child,71 and a mistress becomes entitled to the rights of
a wife only with her keeper's voluntary consent, expressed in a
formal or informal contract of marriage.7 2
What justifies permitting the father to make a choice as to his
child's legitimacy status? Objectively, an illegitimate child would
usually be distinguishable from his legitimate half-sibling on the
following partially overlapping grounds: (1) The father did not
intend to "create" the child, whereas an intent to procreate may at
least be implied in a marriage situation; (2) The father did not
"create" the child against the background of a permanent family
unit; rather, (3) The child was the accidental result of a casual union
with a woman who, since the father did not marry her, probably was
not fully acceptable to him.7 3 But, does this justify the injury which
is inflicted on the child who is deprived of the property rights and
social status accorded most children74 and who is stigmatized with
the contemptible label of "bastard"?75 When the further considera-
71. A number of limitations are discussed in Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Non-
Barrable Interests in Administration of Decedent's Estates, 8 FLA. L. REv. 151 (1955).
72. During recent years, abolition of common law marriage in a growing number
of states has increased the incidence of illegitimacy. Less than one-third of the
states retain the institution. Public policy arguments against the institution of common
law marriage often overlook the interests of the child who, in the absence of any
semblance of a legal relation between his parents or a special statute, is condemned
to bastardy. But see W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4086 (1961) which legitimates the issue of
"common law marriages" that are not valid for any other purpose. See generally JAcoBs
& GOEBEL, CAsEs ON DoMEsTc RELATIONS 93-94 (1961); Weyrauch, Informal Marriage
and Common Law Marriage, in SExuAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAw 297, 300-01 (Slovenko
ed. 1965).
73. The same distinctions apply on the mother's side as well, but as to her, most
states today give the illegitimate child the same rights as are enjoyed by a legitimate
child. Although, within the present framework, it is not necessary to pursue the
questions whether the father and mother are in comparable situations with respect to
their legal relationship with their child and, if so, whether the mother may complain
of unequal treatment if her obligations to her illegitimate child are greater than those
imposed on the child's father, it is at least interesting that the advantages which the
father is given as a matter of course are denied with equal finality to the mother.
74. The sophistic argument that but for the wrongful act the child would not have
been at all, and that therefore he should not complain of what he is (as it presumably
is better than nothing), needs no answer in this context. In a damage inquiry, on the
other hand, the argument may have some relevancy. See note 78 infra.
75. The following is an abbreviated list of defamatory epithets compiled in a lead-
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tion that the father voluntarily brought about this injury to a child
who was helplessly delivered into his predicament is added, it be-
comes clear that the decision to withhold legitimate status from his
offspring cannot properly be considered a decision for the father to
make. Indeed, that the father cannot so decide has probably never
been questioned seriously. The first paternity act in English history
speaks of the father's begetting of a bastard as "an offense against
God's law and man's law,"76 and, for a long time, paternity actions
were criminal prosecutions of the father in which the criminal
offense was the causing of a birth out of wedlock.77 A much discussed
recent case which held that the fathering of an illegitimate child is
a wrongful act-a tort or a crime-committed by the father upon
the child'78 lends further support to the conclusion that the father's
choice to confer upon or withhold from his extra-marital offspring a
legitimate status is not a reasonable criterion on which the state may
base a classification.71 In addition, it might be noted that another
ing textbook on torts: ".... immoral or unchaste, or 'queer'... a coward, a drunkard,
a hypocrite, a liar, a scoundrel, a crook, a scandal-monger, an anarchist, a skunk, a
bastard, a eunuch ... because all of these things obviously tend to affect the esteem
in which he is held by his neighbors." PROSSER, ToRTs 757-58 (3rd ed. 1964). Of course,
quite aside from the neighbors' esteem, an allegation of bastardy may be a serious
matter in that it may dispute eligibility to inherit.
76. 18 Eliz. I, c. 3 (1576). It does not affect the argument that at least the original
paternity statutes were enacted for the protection of the community, rather than for the
benefit of the child.
77. More recently, many states have shifted the paternity action into the civil
sector. The act of fornication was not the offense sought to be punished because no
prosecution would lie if the father had married the mother prior to the child's birth
and thereby legitimated him. Thus, the "[Maryland bastardy law] takes no notice of
fornication as a crime, except where it results in the birth of a child .... If, upon
trial of the question of paternity, he is acquitted.... the admitted fornication is passed
by without further notice." Plunkard v. State, 67 Md. 364, 369, 10 Ad. 225, 226-27
(1887).
78. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 M11. App. 2d 240, 247, 190 N.E.2d 851, 852 (1963); cf. Wil-
liams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd, 25 App. Div. 2d
906, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966). Without attempting to analyze the conceptual problems
inherent in using tort law to alleviate the problems of illegitimacy, we need seize here
upon only those aspects of the holding that classify the father's withholding of legiti-
mate status from his child as a wrongful act, as a choice he is not permitted to make.
In cases like the Zepeda case, it would make more sense if plaintiff would ask the court
for an order to force his father to legitimate him. This would provide legal equality,
which is all the law should be asked to provide. Most of the difficult conceptual prob-
lems that frustrated the Zepeda court arose because plaintiff asked for de facto equality
in the sense that he wanted to have the difference between his situation and that of a
legitimate child made up in damages. See generally Note, Compensation for the Harm-
ful Effects of Illegitimacy, 66 COLUM. L. Rxv. 127 (1966); Note, Liability to Bastard for
Negligence Resulting in His Conception, 18 STAN. L. Rxv. 530 (1966).
79. This situation differs from a case of adoption, in which it is the adopter's
voluntary acceptance of the child that creates the relationship, whereas the relationship
between the father and the illegitimate is created biologically.
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fallacy in the consensual relationship argument is that it puts the
cart before the horse: It may well be said that a correct analysis of
the situation is not that the contractual relationship between the
parents binds them to the support of their children, but rather that
their contractual relationship is merely declaratory of their biologi-
cal relationship with their children and is rooted in social necessity.
80
For purposes of this section, it has so far been assumed that it is
indeed the father's voluntary choice that imposes the discrimination
on the illegitimate child, and that therefore the situation is com-
parable to the case of a father disinheriting a legitimate child.8'
However, this assumption is unsound. If the discrimination against
the child is to be ascribed wholly to the father, the law should pro-
vide the father with an accessible opportunity, short of marrying
the child's mother, for legitimating the child after he is born. A
father has no such opportunity under the laws of many states, 82 and
it is obviously unsatisfactory to say that he can control the legitimacy
status of his child merely by insisting that women engaging in sexual
relations with him be married to him.
F. The "Real" Reason
This discussion has not produced a rational legislative purpose
justifying classification on the basis of illegitimacy. The reason for
this may be that there is no such purpose. Our long continued ac-
ceptance of this legislatively enforced inequality between legitimate
and illegitimate children may rest on much the same ground as did
the inferior position of women, Negroes, and other classes through
the centuries-prejudice.
There has been a long history of discrimination against the ille-
gitimate.83 The medieval church, in both its concern for the family
80. "Marriage and the family are most intimately connected with one another: it
is originally for the benefit of the young that male and female continue to live
together. We may therefore say that marriage is rooted in the family rather than the
family in marriage." In other words, "children do not owe their right of support to the
existence of marriage, but marriage to the necessity of the support of children."
Robbins & Deak, The Familial Property Rights of Illegitimate Children: A Compara-
tive Study, 30 CoLum. L. REv. 308 (1930), citing 1 WEsTERmARcx, HISTORY OF HUMAN
MA mAG 72 (5th ed. 1921).
81. Inheritance rights are discussed in text accompanying note 91 infra.
82. In some states, the father may legitimate his child only with the mother's con.
sent. See Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform
Act on Legitimacy, 44 TaxAs L. Rav. 829, 847 n.50 (1966). A number of states provide
for legitimation only through the marriage of the child's parents. See, e.g., Nichols
v. Estate of Sauls, 250 Miss. 307, 165 So. 2d 352 (1964); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 190, § 7
(1955); MIS. CODE ANN. § 474 (1942). Distinguish the argument made in this section
from the state action argument found in the text accompanying note 54 supra.
83. See BOcKLiNG, Dm RECHTSTEMUNG DER UNEHLICHEN KINDER IA MrrrELALEAR UND
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and its aversion to illicit sex, 84 reinforced the basic self-interest of
the father, which self-interest may ultimately have been most directly
responsible for the situation of the illegitimate. It was natural that
men, as legislators, would have limited their accidental offsprings'
claims against them, both economically and in terms of a family
relationship, especially since the social status of the illegitimate
mother often did not equal their own. Moreover, their legitimate
wives had an interest in denying the illegitimate's claim on their
husbands, since any such claim could be allowed only at the expense
of the legitimate family. Against these forces have stood only the
illegitimate mother and the helpless child,85 and thus it is not
surprising that our laws are inconsiderate of the child's interests.
Indeed, it seems surprising that today the illegitimate does have
some rights against his father, until it is remembered that this
development had its origin in the self-interest of a society which
IN DER HEuTiGEN REFORMBEWEGUNG (1920); Wolff, The Background of the Post-Classical
Legislation on Illegitimacy, 3 SEMINAR 21 (1945). On the whole, the bastard appears to
have fared better under English law than on the European continent. HOOPER, ILLE-
GITIMACY 28, 32 (1911).
84. "The unfortunate, and often tragic, status of the illegitimate child in the great
majority of modem Western family laws is an outcome of the Christian conception of
the monogamous marriage." FRIEDMANN, op. cit. supra note 67, at 251. "[F]ilius nullius
expresses no mere technical uncertainty as to the fatherhood of the bastard, but rather
the moral antipathy, inculcated by the Church, to the irregular intercourse of which
he was the fruit." HOOPER, op. cit. supra note 83, at 27.
As a result of [the church's] hatred of extramarital relations, the usual legal
attitude of laissez faire toward bastards gave way in the middle ages to a treat-
ment of them which deprived them of the ordinary rights of man .... Some law
books treated them as almost rightless beings, on a par with robbers and thieves.
Robbins & Deak, supra note 80, at 315. On the other hand, the bastard had not been
well-off in ancient Rome. See id. at 310.
85. Because of all crimes her crime could be most easily detected, the unmarried
mother suffered most under this new theory of punishment. Man could very easily
conform to the rules of the church, first because his sexual transgression could
not be detected, and then because he could resort to perjury to evade the law.
But the woman could not do this. . . .All religious teachers of old agreed with
Augustine that woman was the "gate of the devil." The church sincerely believed
that it had finally located the root of the whole sex problem; it was the un-
married mother. The whole punishment of sex union fell on her. If the man
could be found out, he too would suffer, but his crime was not at all comparable
to hers. But the greatest injustice was inflicted on the illegitimate children . . ..
Then the large number of unmarried mothers, which steadily increased as the
church victoriously marched forward in its establishment of celibacy, tried to
conform to the requirement of the church by concealing pregnancy, and child-birth,
and then by killing their children secretly. This was the beginning of illegitimate
infanticide ....
The usual punishments for infanticide during the Middle Ages and even into
the eighteenth century were: sacking . . . an infanticide being sewed up in a
sack and thrown into the water; burying alive ... ; empaling . . . , a pointed
stick being driven through the heart; and burning alive .... These cruel forms
of punishment by the civil courts ... were paralleled by the most humiliating
public church penance for the unmarried mother who did not kill her child.




sought protection against the support obligation that it would have
had to bear if the natural father were not held to be responsible."8
Once the public interest had been served by narrow support statutes,
legislators tended to rest,T although there does appear to be one
aspect of familial relationships in which full equality for the bastard
has been realized-the law of incest.88
III. APPLICATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
TO LAWS ON ILLEGITIMACY
There is no doubt that in a society based on the family, illegiti-
macy is a serious social evil-but it is a symptom not a cause.89 A
literal application of the requirements of the equal protection clause
would end or sharply curtail legislated discrimination which is now
mistakenly directed against the illegitimate. In nearly all instances,
classification based upon the criterion of legitimacy alone either is
not related to a proper legislative purpose or, if a proper purpose
is in the picture, such a classification is grossly over- or under-
inclusive. What does this mean with respect to specific discrimina-
tory laws?
A. Right of Support
Nothing more need be said with respect to rights of support to
make the point that, for all rational legislative purposes, the usual
bastard is situated similarly with the usual legitimate child, or at
least with the father's legitimate child by a former marriage.
B. Welfare Legislation
It should be noted that all of the arguments in favor of discrimi-
nation which were discussed above center on the father-child rela-
86. See Robbins & Deak, supra note 80, at 817.
87. See Krause, supra note 82, at 831.
88. The law of incest disregards illegitimacy and holds that incest may be committed
by relatives of any kind within the prohibited degrees. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 59.
89. Humane considerations and the realization that children are such no matter
what their origin alone might compel us to the construction that, under present
day conditions, our social attitude warrants a construction different from that of
the early English view. The purpose and object of the statute is to continue the
support of dependents after a casualty. To hold that these children or the parents
do not come within the terms of the act would be to defeat the purposes of the
act. The benefit conferred beyond being for such beneficiaries is for society's
welfare in making provision for the support of those who might otherwise become
dependent. The rule .that a bastard is nullius filius applies only in cases of in-
heritance.
Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1934) (construing 41 Stat.
537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964)).
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tionship, and that relationship is not in issue in the welfare context.
Here, the relationship between the child and the state or, in a wrong-
ful death action, between the child and a third party, is the subject
matter of the questioned legislation. Therefore, these arguments,
which were refuted in the father-child context are even less relevant
here. Moreover, no other arguments appear to justify discrimination
under welfare laws. On the contrary, the purposes of these laws
would clearly be better served if there were no discrimination against
the illegitimate; his needs normally would be as great as, if not
greater than, those of a legitimate child of the father in question.90
C. Intestacy Laws
At first glance, it may seem to be much more difficult to conclude
that there is unlawful discrimination with respect to rights of in-
heritance. However, the comparison that was drawn earlier 91 be-
tween the father's power to disinherit his legitimate child and the
father's choice to give or deny legitimacy to his bastard child is a
weak analogy when it is measured in terms of the gravity of the
consequences, and it begs the question when considered in connec-
tion with inheritance rights. In the latter instance, the question
must be whether the illegitimate is in the same position vis-4-vis his
father as is his legitimate half-sibling; the answer of course is nega-
ive. The laws of intestate succession express a clear presumption
that the legitimate child will take absent specific action by his father.
However, absent a specific provision in his father's will, the illegiti-
mate child will not take. It may be true that the laws of intestacy are
at the citizen's service and express his presumed intent if he has
failed to express it by will. It may also be true that the majority of
fathers would not wish their bastard child to take under the laws
of intestacy as if they were legitimate, so that the legislated presump-
90. Far in the future, enlightened governmental programs concerning birth control
may provide a more direct solution to the problem of illegitimacy:
Senator Ernest Gruening today accused John W. Gardner, the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, of hiding "under the table" the department's efforts
to spread birth control knowledge. "People are afraid of it, and your department
is afraid of it," the Alaska Democrat said. "You are not tackling your duty with
the enthusiasm that the President of the United States demands."... [Mr. Gardner]
cited the liberalization in recent months of rules on the giving of birth control
information and devices to any woman requesting them. He said his department
was spending $2 million this year on birth control research, double that of last
year; and $3.1 million on family planning services against $2 million in the fiscal
year 1965. "More than 80 of our states are now providing birth control assistance
to families," he added. "Two years ago the number was only 13."
N. Y. Times, April 8, 1966, p. 14, col. 3.
91. See text at note 71 supra.
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tion in favor of the legitimate child finds support in the actual intent
of the majority of intestates. However, the question remains whether
state law may express a prejudice, real though it may be, which rests
on a pattern of discrimination that had been practiced with the
encouragement of the church and the state until it became part of
the "normal" intent of the majority. Finally, even if for purposes
of argument it is assumed that a legislated disadvantage for children
born outside of wedlock is supportable whenever legitimate children
compete with illegitimates, the argument wholly breaks down when,
as present law provides, the illegitimate child loses his father's in-
heritance to a distant but legitimate fifth cousin. It should be noted
that "freedom of disposition" would not be affected if the presump-
tion against the illegitimate were eliminated, since the father would
be free to disinherit his illegitimate child by will, as he is now free
to do with respect to his legitimate child.
D. Visitation, Custody, Adoption
It goes without saying that if the father is unwilling, his affec-
tion cannot be legislated. Given a willing father, the situation is
still uncertain because even the legitimate child's right to his father's
company has rarely been adequately defined. At this point, a look
at the father's right to his child is important since it is the other
side of the same coin and thus helps to define the rights of the child.
Furthermore, while the argument in this paper centers on the child's
position, the establishment of a familial relationship between father
and illegitimate child would demand that the father be given some
rights with respect to the child. Indeed, a plausible variation of the
equal protection argument would be that the father and the mother
of the child are situated similarly with respect to the child's custody
and with respect to other rights over the child, so that it would deny
equal protection to the father if he were not accorded rights that are
given to the mother. Thus, he should be entitled to be heard on
issues such as the child's general welfare, including his custody and
education. The father's rights would extend to adoption matters,
and thus the appropriateness of an adoption would have to be con-
sidered in the light of the interests of all three parties involved:
the father, the mother, and the child. Moreover, since there is
nothing unacceptable in principle about terminating parental rights
if the child's interest requires such action, consideration of the
father's interest would not unduly hinder adoption proceedings.
Finally, the father's relationship with his illegitimate child should
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generally include his right to inherit from or be supported by the
child to the extent that state law provides these rights to the father
of a legitimate child.
A countervailing consideration is that the state's interest in
maintaining the integrity of the family becomes forceful in this area.
If the father has a legitimate family, his wife could hardly, and very
probably should not, be forced to accept an extra-marital child into
her home. Thus, on superficial inspection, laws distinguishing be-
tween illegitimates and legitimates for purposes of defining rights of
visitation and custody do not seem as vulnerable as other instances
of legislated discrimination. However, on closer inspection, present
law does fail the equal protection test because it decides these ques-
tions on the basis of the criterion of legitimacy alone; such an ap-
proach takes no account of the actual family situation. Often a
family may not be in the picture, or the family involved may not be
entitled to consideration. Thus, if the father decides to establish a
new family, the illegitimate should not be deprived of any rights
against his father which a legitimate child of a former marriage
could not be forced to relinquish.
E. Paternal Name
The illegitimate's claim to his father's name cannot be advanced
as a general proposition, for here there are rational distinctions be-
tween the child born into a family and the illegitimate. At least
one function of the "family" name of the father is to identify those
persons who live with him in an economic and social unit. This
purpose would not be served if the father's name were given to an
illegitimate who does not live with him. In addition, the state may
consider that the mother has a proper interest in naming the child
after herself, especially if she lives in a social and economic unit with
her illegitimate child or children. On the other hand, the use of
the father's name by the child also indicates his ancestry and, given
the right father, the name can be of economic and social value.
While a proper answer must be based on a case by case evaluation
of these conflicting considerations, it is clear that the present prac-
tice of deciding the name question by using legitimacy as the sole
criterion is arbitrary. Thus, once again, the law defines its categories
poorly in relation to its purpose, for the legitimate child not living
with the father will bear his name, although the illegitimate who




As was said at the outset of this discussion, no universal, black-
white answer is possible or desirable. It is not argued that all dis-
tinctions between the legitimate and the illegitimate are not a
proper concern of the state in the exercise of its police power. But
whatever the conclusion as to any specific instance of discrimination,
it seems clear that the wholesale discrimination imposed by our
present legal order cannot be supported.
At one end of the spectrum of legislation discriminating against
the illegitimate, the equal protection argument should be sufficient
to dictate a change in the laws of those states that do not now impose
an obligation of support on the father of an illegitimate child, or
that now provide to the illegitimate a right of support which differs
significantly from that possessed by a legitimate child. Discrimina-
tion under welfare laws is similarly wholly indefensible. At the
other extreme, it is obvious that an application of the equal pro-
tection clause would not require the enforcement of an illegitimate's
claim to paternal affection. Until social prejudices disappear-and
legislated equalization of the bastard's situation would further this
goal 2-an attempt to legislate for the illegitimate a right to his
father's company, as distinguished from his money, will fail. The
other conduits of discrimination, such as the inheritance laws, lie
somewhere between these two extremes.
Fortunately for the illegitimate, his case for equal protection is
strongest in the areas which are of the greatest practical importance
to him. While few illegitimates would gain from a provision for in-
heritance rights under the intestacy laws, many would benefit from
an enlarged right of support. Few illegitimates would gain from a
right to use the paternal name, but many would benefit from cover-
age under welfare laws.
92. Illegitimacy was a topic during and shortly after world War I. At that time,
the U.S. Government published a number of studies relating to illegitimacy, and state
legislatures took a fresh look at the subject. One of the foremost advocates of reform
at that time, however, was cautious and pessimistic in his views: "It thus appears that
the practical consequences of assimilating the status of the illegitimate child to that
of a legitimate child are limited. And this is what may be expected of an attempt to
alter by legislation social conditions and concepts." FREUND, ILLEGITIMACY LAws OF THE
UNrED STATES AND CERTAIN FOREIGN CouNTRIEs 58 (1919). Freund reflected an attitude
not unlike that of the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896),
where these famous last words were spoken:
The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation,
and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an enforced com-
mingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races are
to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a
mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.
To say the least, legislation has helped.
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Affirmatively, since there can be no equality unless the father is
known, "equal protection" would require that a mechanism be
provided so as to ascertain the illegitimate's paternity whenever
possible.93 If the child's rights are to be protected, the child's mother
cannot have a right of "veto" over the paternity action. A paternity
suit should be brought by appropriate state authorities on behalf
of any child for whose benefit no such action has been brought and
whose paternity has not been otherwise established within a reason-
able period of time after his birth.94
The goal here is limited to legal equality of the illegitimate and
the legitimate child. With the family at the base of our social struc-
ture, full equality will be prevented-simply because the legitimate
usually is born into a family and the illegitimate is not. However,
the factual impossibility of perfect equality is no excuse for failing
to provide the degree of equality which the law can effectively fur-
nish-the argument that law cannot make blacks white nor whites
black provided no reason against legislating racial equality. An
unwilling father is better than none. Decades ago, the concept of
illegitimacy was successfully discarded by statute in Arizona and
Oregon.0 5 Experience in these states has shown that the goal of legal
equality of legitimate and illegitimate children is achievable.
Is this the time and place to realize the literal requirement of
equal protection in the law of illegitimacy? In finding the answer
to this question, it should be recognized that the problem of illegiti-
macy is an important factor in the "war on poverty." American
93. This finds support in the fact that the state now provides a strong presumption
of paternity for the child born in wedlock, and even the rebuttal of that presumption
usually involves the substitution of the child's real father for the presumed father.
See note 58 supra.
94. Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.33 (1959) which provides:
It shall be the duty of the commissioner of public welfare when notified of a
woman who is delivered of an illegitimate child, or pregnant with child likely
to be illegitimate when born, to take care that the interests of the child are safe-
guarded, that appropriate steps are taken to establish his paternity, and that
there is secured for him the nearest possible approximation to the care, support,
and education that he would be entitled to if born of lawful marriage.
95. Arizona provides that "every child is the legitimate child of its natural parents
and is entitled to support and education as if born in lawful wedlock, except that he
is not entitled to the right to dwell or reside with the family of his father, if the
father is married," and "every child shall inherit from its natural parents and from
,their kindred heir, lineal and collateral, in the same manner as children born in
lawful wedlock," even when "the natural father of such child is married to a woman
other than the mother of the child, as well as when he is single." ARiz. Rlv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-206 (1956). The Oregon statute is similar: "The legal status and legal relationships
and the rights and obligations between a person and his descendants, and between a
person and his parents, their descendants and kindred, are the same for all persons,
whether or not the parents have been married." Oma. REv. STAT. § 109.060 (1957).
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"poverty," a situation in which many of the statistical "poor" have
television sets and automobiles, is as much a social problem as it is
an economic one; individually and collectively, it is as much a crisis
of self-respect as it is of money. This poverty will disappear only if
the social level of the "poor" is raised concurrently with their
material welfare. It seems clear that if about one third of the "poor"
are illegitimate and thereby subject to discrimination under state
and federal law, improving their social position depends at least in
part upon a change in these laws.96 If we wish to bring the poor into
society, our laws must let them in.97
96. See notes 51-52 supra.
97. Would our courts today uphold laws that barred illegitimates from public office,
such as judgeships, that reduced criminal penalties for the murder of an illegitimate to
farcical levels, that prevented illegitimates from appearing or being witnesses in court,
that denied them burial and that provided for escheat of their bodies to medical
schools upon their deaths? BiicauNc, op. cit. supra note 83, at 75-89. If these disabilities,
all of which the illegitimate once bore, offend our modem sense of justice, we should
question the part of the burden that remains-with all deliberate speed.
